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whose intellectual disability is considered to be "borderline" (i.e., IQs
within the 65-75 range). This Article examines some of these issues from
three states (Texas, Florida, and Alabama).
Because the meaning of intellectual disability and attempts to measure
it have been elusive, the courts' search for a particular objective measure
for determining who should be exempt under Atkins will continue to
result in arbitrary outcomes. This Article proposes that the focus should
shift to a broader conceptualization of intellectual disability embodied
within a social construction model to include examining the social
context and its relationship to how an individual functions and reasons.
Only then can a greater number of defendants who function along the
borders of "intelligence" benefit from the Supreme Court's Atkins ruling.
I. INTRODUCTION

As public opinion increasingly disfavors execution of defendants with
intellectual disabilities (ID) for capital crimes, the ongoing debate
regarding for whom such punishment should be permitted continues to
raise questions about how society views our criminal justice system for
those with ID.' The hope was that the Supreme Court's ruling in Atkins
v. Virginia2 would end such executions.3 However, because the Supreme
Court left it up to each state to determine who would qualify under this
exemption, Atkins opened another set of issues: how to determine
intellectually disability from a legal perspective.'
Each state's statute regarding the death penalty for individuals with
ID since the Supreme Court ruling in Atkins has varied widely, as state
legislatures have passed statutes that would reflect the public's view and
courts have interpreted and applied the state statutes to the cases before
1. Judith M. Barger, Avoiding Atkins v. Virginia: How States are CircumventingBoth the
Letter and the Spirit of the Court's Mandate, 13 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 215 (2008). According to
the Death Penalty Information Center, eighteen states have abolished the death penalty for
everyone, and six of those have occurred since the Supreme Court's ruling in Atkins. See States
with and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, http://www.death

penaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (last visited June 1, 2014).
2. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). In Atkins, Justice Stevens noted that because defendants with ID
have "disabilities in the areas of reasoning, judgment, and control of their impulses . . . they do
not act with the level of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious adult criminal
conduct." Id. at 306. Atkins had a reported IQ of 59. Id. at 309.
3. See Neva Feldman, Annotation, Application of Constitutional Rule of Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 US. 304, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 153 L. Ed. 2d 335 (2002), that Execution of Mentally
Retarded Persons Constitutes "Cruel and Unusual Punishment" in Violation of Eighth
Amendment, 122 A.L.R. 5th 145 (2004); Symposium, An EmpiricalLook at Atkins v. Virginia
and Its Application in Capital Cases, 76 TENN. L. REV. 625 (2008).
4. See Lois A. Weithorn, ConceptualHurdles to the Application ofAtkins v. Virginia, 59
HASTINGS L.J. 1203 (2008).
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them.5 Yet the general public has little understanding of ID, especially
when the person functions along the borders of average intelligence.6
There is often a general public perception that these individuals are more
capable than they actually are.' Furthermore, most individuals have great
difficulty understanding the relationship between intelligence and
criminal culpability.8
This Article explores how the courts in Texas, Florida, and Alabama
have addressed post-Atkins death penalty cases. These three states were
selected because they have had some of the highest number of post-Atkins
challenges.9 According to the Death Penalty Information Center, these
states also had some of the highest number of executions of individuals
with ID prior to the Atkins decision.t 0
5. According to the Death Penalty Information Center, eight states passed statutes
following the Atkins decision and eighteen states had already had statutes prohibiting the
execution of defendants with ID. States That Have Changed Their Statutes to Comply with the
Supreme Court's Decision in Atkins v. Virginia, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-have-changed-their-statutes-comply-supreme-courts-dec

ision-atkins-v-virginia (last visited Apr. 22, 2014).
&

6. See generally Brooke Amos, Note, Atkins v. Virginia: Analyzing the CorrectStandard
andExamination Practicesto Use When DeterminingMental Retardation,14 J. GENDER RACE

JUST. 469 (2010); Natalie Cheung, Note, Defining Intellectual Disability and Establishing a
StandardofProof Suggestionsfor a National Model Standard, 23 HEALTH MATRIx 317 (2013).
7. See Nancy Haydt et al., Advantages of DSM-5 in the Diagnosis of Intellectual
Disability:Reduced Reliance on IQ Ceilings in Atkins (DeathPenalty) Cases, 82 UMKC L. REv.

359 (2014) (noting that individuals with mild disabilities can often appear functional and
determining whether the disability is organic or a result of lack of access to opportunities or failure
of the public school systems continues to be difficult to determine).
8.

Weithorn, supra note 4.

9. To do this, a WestlawNext search was conducted to identify state cases using Westlaw's
key number K1642 (this key number is associated with death penalty for defendants with mental
retardation). Only cases after the June 20, 2002 Atkins decision were included. Each case was
examined to ensure that it related to a defendant who was claiming an exemption from the death
penalty because of an intellectual disability. Cases involving the same defendant were also
counted as one case. The final list of cases showed that Florida, Texas, and Alabama had the
highest number of cases, accounting for 36% of the total cases. For these three states, another
WestlawNext search was conducted using the advanced search option. The term retard! was used

for the field "any of these terms" (this term was used because "mental retardation" and "mentally
retarded" were the most common terms used prior to the change to "intellectual disability") and
the term death penalty was used for the field "this exact phrase." Filters were then applied to
identify only criminal cases and cases during the post-Atkins time period. Both reported and
unreported cases were included. These cases were reviewed and only cases that involved a
defendant claiming exemption from the death penalty because of an intellectual disability were
included for analysis. Cases involving the same defendant were counted only once. Cases included
in this manuscript include the combined cases found from Westlaw's key number search plus the
cases found as a result of the refined WestlawNext search. Only cases as of May 8, 2014, which
is when the search for this Article was conducted, are included.
10. Prior to Atkins, Texas' execution of nine defendants with ID represented 20% of the
national total, and Alabama's and Florida's execution of four defendants with ID represented 9%
of the total. See List of Defendants with Mental RetardationExecuted in the United States, DEATH
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A. Backgroundon Death Penaltyfor Individuals with
IntellectualDisabilities
Overturning its prior holding in Penry v. Lynaugh where the Supreme
Court had held that it was not unconstitutional to execute defendants with
ID," in Atkins, the Court held that based on society's "evolving standards
of decency," 2 it would now be unconstitutional to execute individuals
with ID.1 3 During the period between Penry and Atkins, forty-four
defendants with ID were executed.1 4 What was unusual about the Atkins
ruling was that it exempted an entire class of defendants from a particular
form of punishment.' 5
These changing views have been based on the realization that the
retributive and deterrent justifications for the death penalty made little
sense when applied to those with ID.1 6 Proponents seeking abolition of
the death penalty for defendants with ID further pointed to a number of
longstanding problems for these defendants within the criminal justice
system.' 7

PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/list-defendants-mental-retarda

tion-executed-united-states (last visited Apr. 30, 2014).
11. 492 U.S. 302 (1989). Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority stated, "The Eighth
Amendment does not categorically prohibit the execution of mentally retarded capital murderers
of petitioner's reasoning ability." Id. at 305. Nevertheless, Justice O'Connor noted that the
punishment should be "directly related to the personal culpability of the defendant." Id. at 304.
12. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (noting that "death is not a suitable punishment" for defendants
with ID in light of the number of legislatures that have addressed this issue, and concluding that
within this context, such punishment "is excessive").
13. Id. at 310. Atkins had a full scale IQ of 59, and the Virginia courts stated that
commuting his sentence to life imprisonment would not be justified "merely because of his IQ
score." Following this Supreme Court ruling, Atkins' sentence was commuted to life
imprisonment. Donna St. George, DeathSentence Commuted in Va. Case, WASH. POST, Jan. 18,
2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/17/AR2008011703172.
html.
14. See Denis Keyes et al., People With Mental RetardationAre Dying, Legally: At Least
44 Have Been Executed, 40 MENTAL RETARDATION 243, 243 (2002).

15. Haydt et al., supra note 7, at 362.
16. See generally Philip Fougerousse, The Demise of the Death Penaltyfor the Mentally
Retarded, 77 FLA. B.J. 11, 63 (2003); Edward Miller, Note, Executing Minors and the Mentally
Retarded: The Retribution and Deterrence Rationales, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 15 (1990); Jamie
Fellner & Dorean M. Koenig, Beyond Reason: Executing Persons with Mental Retardation, 28
HUM. RTs. 3 (2001).

17. See generally Rosa Ehrenreich & Jamie Fellner, Beyond Reason: The Death Penalty
and Offenders with Mental Retardation, 13 Hum. RTS. WATCH 1, 5 (2001) (noting issues with
disclosure and testimony during questioning of defendants with ID and difficulty with defendants
with ID in participating in their own defenses).
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1. Historical Treatment of Individuals with Intellectual Disabilities
Not surprising, how the courts have addressed defendants with ID has
paralleled society's historical treatment of individuals with ID based
largely on prejudicial views of individuals with ID.' 8 During the eugenics
and institutionalization movement of the early 1900s, many individuals
who did not have ID were sent to institutions for suspected ID based on
behaviors such as truancy, promiscuity, or even because of being an
orphan.1 9 Individuals qualified for removal from society often are based
on very little actual evidence of ID.2 0 Scholars have noted that much of
the institutionalization movement arose out of societal fears and
prejudice.21 Within this context, in 1927, Justice Holmes delivered the
famous statement that "three generations of imbeciles are enough,"
upholding that sterilization of individuals with ID prior to releasing them
from institutions was justified.2 2
The issue of how to treat defendants with ID within the criminal
justice system was first presented to the courts as society began to
question whether these defendants should be held morally culpable
within the evolving penal theories based on retribution and deterrence. 23
Penry raised the issue of the role of ID as a mitigating factor during the
sentencing phase. 24 After being heard twice before the Supreme Court, it
18. See generally Laurence A. French, Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty: The
Clinical andLegal Legacy, 69 FED. PROBATION 16, 16-20 (2005).
19. See Margaret Quigley, Eugenics and Social Control, in EYES RIGHT! CHALLENGING
THE RIGHT WING BACKLASH (Chip Berlet ed., 1995).
20.

See J. DAVID SMITH & MICHAEL L. WEHMEYER, GOOD BLOOD, BAD BLOOD: SCIENCE,

NATURE, AND THE MYTH OF THE KALLIKAKS (2012); Quigley, supra note 19.

21.

For a history of the eugenics movement and society's response to those deemed to be
&

intellectually disabled, see MICHAEL D'ANTONIo, THE STATE Boys REBELLION (2004); SMITH
WEHMEYER, supra note 20. See also Cheung, supra note 6, at 342-43 (discussing whyjurors tend

to have great difficulty with determining intellectual disability for those who have more mild
forms because of stereotyped views).
22. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
23.

See generally Miller, supra note 16.

24. The Supreme Court heard Penry's claim on two separate appeals. Penry v. Johnson,
532 U.S. 782 (2001); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989). John Penry's reported IQ scores
ranged from 50-63 and his social maturity "was that of a 9 or 10-year-old." Penry, 492 U.S. at
307-08. On the first appeal, the Court held that the jury instructions during the sentencing phase
failed to allow the jury to give "a moral reasoned response" to the mitigating circumstances in
order to consider the possibility of life imprisonment instead of the death penalty because the
special issues questions limited how the jury could consider Penry's ID. Id. at 320 ("The jury that
sentenced him was only able to express its views on the appropriate sentence by answering three
questions: Did Penry act deliberately when he murdered Pamela Carpenter? Is there a probability
that he will be dangerous in the future? Did he act unreasonably in response to provocation?").
Upon remand, the trial court added instructions for how the jury was to respond to the three special
issues questions. Penry, 532 U.S. at 798. However, the instructions were still held to be confusing
and contradictory because the Court noted that when the instructions were provided, there was
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became clear that a defendant's evidence of ID should be meaningfully
considered by the jury to determine whether imposition of the death
penalty is warranted.2 5 Yet, it was not until Atkins that the Supreme Court
held that the death penalty for defendants with ID was unconstitutional.2 6
As a result of Atkins, there has been an intense focus on how to determine
who would qualify as having ID, and thus, be exempt from the death
penalty. 27 In many ways, Atkins brought before the legal community the
inherent issues with which the professional field of ID has struggled:
defining the meaning of ID (and/or intelligence), 28 and how an objective
measure and procedure could accurately identify ID. 29 As noted by
professionals in the field, ID cannot be identified in the same way that the
medical profession diagnoses diseases. 30 Instead, professionals must
identify suspected ID by noting behavioral patterns and/or observed
traits.31

2. Continuing Problems with Attempts to Measure
Intellectual Disability
Development of a standardized IQ measure was believed to be one
way to minimize arbitrary identification of ID.3 2 However, actually
still no clear way for the jury to consider the mitigating factor of Penry's ID while answering
truthfully to the three questions despite the additional instructions. Id. Again, the Court remanded
the case. After this ruling, Penry's sentence was reduced to life imprisonment on February 15,
2008 as a result of a plea bargain. Mike Tolson, DealKeeps Death Row Inmate Penry Imprisoned
for Life, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 16, 2008, http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Dealkeeps-death-row-inmate-Penry-imprisoned-for- 1 578006.php.
25.

26.
27.
note 3.
28.

Tolson, supra note 24.

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
An Empirical Look at Atkins v. Virginia and Its Application in Capital Cases, supra
For a chronological history of how intellectual disability has been defined in the past,

see DEFINITIONS OF INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY/MENTAL RETARDATION: A CHRONOLOGICAL LIST

WITH DATES AND REFERENCES, http://www.eds-resources.com/mrdefinitions2.htm

(last updated

Feb. 15, 2001).
29.
See MICHAEL L. WEHMEYER, THE STORY OF INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: AN EVOLUTION
OF MEANING, UNDERSTANDING, AND PUBLIC PERCEPTION (2013).
30.
RUTH LUCKASSON ET AL., MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND
SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS (2002).

31. See, e.g., Edward A. Polloway et al., Mild Intellectual Disabilities: Legacies and
Trends in Concepts and Educational Practices, 45 EDUC. & TRAINING IN DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES 54 (2010); Stephen Greenspan, Assessment andDiagnosisofMental Retardation in
Death Penalty Cases: Introduction and Overview of the Special "Atkins" Issue, 16 APPLIED
NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 89 (2009).

32.

Stephen Greenspan & Harvey N. Switzky, Execution Exemption Should Be Based on

Actual Vulnerability, Not Disability Label, 13 ETHICS & BEHAV. 19 (2003); Haydt et al., supra

note 7, at 363 (noting that starting with the 1961 AAIDD manual, and continuing through
subsequent AAIDD and DSM manuals, a consistent theme has been the need to move the field of

COURTS' ELUSIVE SEARCH FOR THE MEANING OF INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY

2015]1

353

identifying who does and does not have ID has continued to be debated
and has proved to be far more challenging. 33 Even with increased focus
on standardized IQ measures, many individuals were misidentified as
having ID. 4 These standardized measures have been fraught with validity
and reliability issues. 35 Moreover, use of artificial cut-off scores on such
measures was viewed as arbitrary. 36 Even more troubling was continued
findings that such measures were often racially biased and often more a
measure of poverty than actual intelligence.3 7
Because reliance on measures of IQ had proved problematic,
professionals proposed the adaptive behavior skills component to
supplement the IQ score. 38 Based on the concept that ID should be
diagnosed according to how the individual actually functions within the
environment, the purpose of the adaptive behavior measure is to
determine whether the IQ score has affected the individual's functional
performance such that the performance score falls within the range of
ID.39 These adaptive behavior measures have also proved to be
problematic because scores on these measures depend on who completes
the interview, and there are many issues with using self-report for
completing the assessment. 40

ID beyond its excessive reliance on IQ, including somewhat arbitrary IQ ceilings).
33. See, e.g., Haydt et al., supra note 7, at 362 ("When Justice Stevens wrote the decision
in Atkins, he and the others in the majority likely assumed that determining the outcomes in ID
proceedings would be easier and more straightforward than turned out to be the case. In fact,

Atkins hearings are often highly disputatious, lengthy, and expensive proceedings, which pose
intellectual challenges to judges and attorneys, few of which bring to these hearings a
sophisticated understanding of the ID field or of the complex definitions and issues involved in
making such a diagnosis.").
34. WEHMEYER, supra note 29.
35.

Frank M. Gresham, Interpretation of Intelligence Test Scores in Atkins Cases:

ConceptualandPsychometric Issues, 16 APPLIED NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 91 (2009).
36. Haydt et al., supra note 7, at 367 (noting that ID differs from virtually all other
categories covered in the DSM manuals in that it is the only one that has been defined largely on
the basis of an arbitrary point in a statistical continuum and should instead be based on judgment
by a qualified clinician who would consider a variety of information regarding etiology rather
than on a single discrete measure).
37. See Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 981 (9th Cir. 1984) (raising the issue of using IQ
scores for placing disproportionate numbers of African American students into classes for the
"educable mentally retarded" and holding that the school district had "violated the provisions of
the Rehabilitation Act and the Education For All Handicapped Children Act (1) by not insuring
that the tests were validated for the specific purpose for which they are used, and (2) by not using
the variety of statutorily mandated evaluation tools"). See also Donna Y. Ford et al., The Coloring
ofIQ Testing: A New Name for an Old Phenomenon, 13 URB. LEAGUE REV. 99 (1990).
38. See generally Marc J. Tass6, Adaptive Behavior Assessment and the Diagnosis of
Mental Retardation in CapitalCases, 16 APPLIED NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 114 (2009).

39.
40.

Id.
Id.
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B. State Proceduresfor Addressing Atkins Claims
When the Supreme Court held that it is a violation of the Eighth
Amendment to execute defendants with ID, states sought procedures for
determining who would qualify as exempt under Atkins. Although there
appears to be general agreement across definitions of lID in state statutes,
as will be seen, the devil is often in the details. 4 1 These details have
differed in several ways: procedures for raising Atkins claims; assigning
burden of proof required; and designating whether the judge or the jury
would determine whether the defendant qualified as having ID. In
addition, special issues have arisen, resulting in variations for identifying
legal standards for defining ID. 42
1. Evaluating Atkins Claims
For the most part, states have applied the 3-prong test based on the
AAIDD (American Association of Intellectual and Developmental
Disabilities) and the APA's (American Psychiatric Association) DSM-IVTR. 43 However, the ways that each prong (except for the third) is
determined varies considerably. 44 Furthermore, states will vary on how
much weight to give each of the prongs. 4 5 The first two prongs have been
41. See, e.g., Anna M. Hagstrom, Note, Atkins v. Virginia: An Empty HoldingDevoid of
Justicefor the Mentally Retarded, 27 L. & INEQ. 241 (2009) (comparing the responses of Texas,
New Jersey, and Louisiana to the Atkins decision and highlighting inconsistencies in the ways
courts determine intellectual disability and concluding that Atkins failed to ensure protection from
death penalty, resulting in states performing unconstitutional executions).
42. See Sarah E. Wood et al., A Failure to Implement: Analyzing State Responses to the
Supreme Court's Directives in Atkins v. Virginia and Suggestions for a NationalStandard, 21
PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 16 (2014).

43. See, e.g., Haydt et al., supra note 7, at 368 (noting that the APA's DSM-IV-TR
definition was based on, and similar to, the AAMR's 1992 definition have been adopted in the
statutes of most jurisdictions, which specified three criteria: (1) significant limitations in
intellectual functioning, (2) significant limitations in adaptive behavior, and (3) onset of disability
before eighteen years of age); Cheung, supra note 6, at 319 (noting that the definitions of
intellectual disability endorsed by the APA and the AAIDD are similar, but not identical, which
created confusion among the states concerning which definition to follow, resulting in disparity
amongst the states whereby a defendant executed in one state could have been considered
intellectually disabled and thus ineligible for execution in another).
44.

Amos, supra note 6, at 482 (noting that there are three categories of states based on the

method they use to determine if an individual is intellectually disabled: (1) states that use an
objective standard as proposed by a mental health association such as the AAIDD or APA; (2)
states that use the terms used in the APA or AAIDD but decline to objectively define those terms
and rely on the judicial branch to interpret the legislation; and (3) states that have a presumption
of ID if the measured IQ falls below an objective standard stated in the statute).
45. An Empirical Look at Atkins v. Virginia and Its Application in Capital Cases, supra
note 3, at 632. In Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1997 (2014), Justice Kennedy noted that five
states allow defendants to present additional evidence even when the defendant's IQ score is
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the focus of many Atkins claims, because how these two prongs are
applied often makes the difference in the outcome of a case.4
The first prong focuses on the IQ score. How IQ scores are used to
determine ID varies because states may rely more heavily on particular
measures, adjust for the Flynn effect, 4 7 or apply the Standard Error of
Measurement (SEM) 48 to identify an IQ score range. One of the more
contentious issues has been the use of a strict IQ cut-off score, which is
usually at or below an IQ of 70.49 This is especially problematic for
individuals who score within the 65-75 range when application of the
SEM can make the difference between whether a defendant will be
considered to have or not have ID. 50 Furthermore, how this first prong is
above 70.
46. An Empirical Look at Atkins v. Virginia and Its Application in Capital Cases, supra
note 3, at 630 (finding that only 2% of Atkins claims failed prong 3).
47. The Flynn effect is based on the premise that IQ scores of the general population is
increasing over time, and that because IQ scores are based on population norms at a particular
point in time, adjustments to IQ scores should be adjusted to reflect changes to the norm. James
R. Flynn, The Mean IQ ofAmericans: Massive Gains 1932 to 1978,95 PSYCHOL. BULL. 29 (1984).
See Geraldine W. Young, Note, A More IntelligentandJust Atkins: Adjusting for the Flynn Effect
in CapitalDeterminationsofMental Retardationor IntellectualDisability,65 VAND. L. REv. 615,

617 (2012) ("To adjust American IQ scores for this inflation, the Flynn Effect calls for a score
reduction of 0.3 points for every year that has passed between the year the test publisher
standardized the test and the year the subject took the test.").
48.

IQ scores are generally reported within what is called a standard error or measurement

(SEM) because individual results on these measures can vary from one administration to the other.
See Gresham, supra note 35. The SEM typically results in a score range of a plus or minus five
points. Whether the SEM is applied by the court can be especially important for someone who
has an IQ score of 70 because the actual score range could be between 65 and 75, or for someone
who has an IQ score of 75, the actual score range could be between 70 and 80. Because the APA
and the AAIDD has defined ID as an IQ score of 70 or below, which is two standard deviations
below the norm, how a court applies the SEM can make the difference between whether a
defendant will be considered to have ID. As noted by Justice Cochran, the IQ score can be viewed
as the "glass half-empty" or the "glass half-full." Exparte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2004) (noting that the defense expert focused on the lower score range while the prosecution
focused on the upper score range).
49. See Holly T. Sharp, Note, Determining Mental Retardation in Capital Defendants:
Usinga StrictlQ Cut-offNumber WillAllow the Execution ofMany ThatAtkins Intendedto Spare-

Ex Parte State (Smith v. State), 12 JONEs L. REv. 227 (2008); Editorial Board, Florida's
UnconstitutionalDeath Penalty,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/04/

opinion/floridas-unconstitutional-death-penalty.html?_r-0. See also Cheung, supra note 6, at
327. Cheung noted that because California does not statutorily require a cut-off score, other means
for establishing ID are allowed, even if the defendant were to obtain an IQ score of 70 or above.
Whereas, Kansas has a cut-off score of 70 or below. On the other hand, Ohio's statute specifies
that there is a rebuttable presumption of no ID if a person scores above 70 and the defendant must
rebut by proving the other two prongs. Id. at 328. Illinois' statute provides for a presumption of
ID for an IQ score of 75 or below. Id. Kentucky has a strict cut-off score of 70. Id. Arkansas'
statute specifies a rebuttable presumption for a score of 65 or below, making it one of the strictest
statutes in the United States. Id. at 329.
50. See John Matthew Fabian et al., Life, Death, and 1Q: It's Much More than Just a Score:
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applied and the weight that this prong carries can vary from state to
state."' Another issue has been how to determine whether a defendant
exhibits significant deficits in adaptive behaviors (the second prong).52
The legal standards for determining ID generally employ the
determinations recommended by professionals in the field of ID;
however, in some states, the legal standards can be more restrictive. As
Justice Cochran noted in Briseno, determinations of ID by mental health
professionals and determinations in the criminal context are different
because mental health professionals seek a broad definition to ensure that
individuals are eligible for social services support in order to minimize
the adverse effects of having ID.53 On the other hand, the courts must
determine whether a person should be held morally culpable based on the
interests of society's need for justice. 54 Justice Cochran reasoned that
most citizens would not support a blanket exemption for individuals with
mild ID." In addition, the public may not view individuals who qualify
for services for ID as necessarily being automatically less morally
culpable, particularly those "who just barely miss meeting those
criteria." 56 Similarly, a Tennessee court using the public view as a basis
reasoned that the legislature and public did not intend the statute to mean
a strict cut-off score above 70, leaving the court to consider other factors
for determining whether a defendant should be considered exempt from
the death penalty because of ID.5' Therefore, some courts appear to rely
on the public's view for determining whether a defendant should be
exempt from the death penalty.
2. Burden of Proof Standards
Courts have varied on whether to apply a rigorous standard for a
defense raising an exemption from the death penalty due to ID or whether
to apply similar standards as required for an affirmative defense. 58
Understanding and Utilizing Forensic Psychological and Neuropsychological Evaluations in
Atkins IntellectualDisability/MentalRetardationCases, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 399 (2011) (noting

that the implications of the inconsistency in IQ tests for individuals who achieve a borderline IQ
score results in the difference between life and death).
51. An Empirical Look at Atkins v. Virginia and Its Application in Capital Cases, supra
note 3, at 635.
52. Id
53. Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 6.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See Thomas Cotton, Case Comment, State Constitutional Law-Cruel and Unusual
Punishment-Morethanjust an I. Q. Test may be Needed to Show IntellectualDisability. Coleman

v. State, 341 S. W.3d 221 (Tenn. 2011), 43 RUTGERS L.J. 635 (2013).
58. See Hagstrom, supra note 41, at 255-58 (noting that preponderance of evidence
standard is used in Texas, because the courts view claims of ID as falling under the same criteria
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According to Justice Cochrane, in Briseno, twelve of the nineteen states
prohibiting the execution of defendants with ID used the preponderance
of the evidence standard.5 9 Five of the nineteen states, including Texas,
used the clear and convincing standard, which is the most difficult burden
to meet, and two of the states had not set a standard for establishing
burden of proof.60
3. Who Determines Whether Defendant has Intellectual Disabilities
Who should determine whether a defendant meets the criteria for ID
also varies by jurisdictions. 6 1 Some have argued that experts
knowledgeable about ID and procedures for assessing should be given
deference in a court proceeding. 62 Others have argued that the judge or
the jury is in the best position to determine whether a defendant has ID
and should be exempted from the death penalty. 63 Interestingly, Justice
Alito's dissent in Hall noted that determination of who does or does not
have ID should be determined by society and the courts, not
professionals. 64 Still, those who have opposed having a jury make the
determination have pointed to the inherent biases that can be problematic
when juries play the role in determining whether the defendant before
as any affirmative defense; Louisiana statutorily requires the defendant to prove ID by a

preponderance of the evidence and such a claim must be raised in a pre-trial proceeding; and the
New Jersey Supreme Court has held that ID should be treated similarly as an insanity defense
rather than diminished capacity, meaning that the person's punishment should be reduced even
though they may have had the required mental state).
59. Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 12.
60. Id. at 12 n.44 (noting that clear and convincing standard was used in Arizona, Colorado,
Delaware, Florida, and Indiana).
61. See Amos, supra note 6, at 482 (noting that States generally fall into three different
categories: (1) states that allow the defense, prosecution, or both to choose its own qualified health
professional; (2) states that use court appointed health professionals; and (3) states that do not
specify who can be a qualified examiner).
62.

ROBERT L. SCHALOCK & RUTH LUCKASSON, CLINICAL JUDGMENT (2d ed. 2014). See

also Amos, supra note 6, at 494 (noting that a judge or healthcare professional determines if an
individual is intellectually disabled prior to trial in some jurisdictions).
63. Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 9 (noting that the ultimate determination should be made by
the fact finder, such as the judge of the convicting court in a post-conviction hearing, "based upon
all of the evidence and determinations of credibility").
64. Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 2002 (2014).
In these prior cases, when the Court referred to the evolving standards of a
maturing "society," the Court meant the standards of American society as a

whole. Now, however, the Court strikes down a state law based on the evolving
standards of professional societies, most notably the American Psychiatric
Association.

Id.
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them appears to satisfy their preconceived ideas regarding intelligence
and whether someone is intelligent enough to appreciate the
consequences of their actions. 65
II. EFFECT OF A TKINs IN SELECTED STATES

As seen, state court determinations for determining the standards and
procedures for Atkins claims can vary considerably. In addition, how the
courts apply the statutory requirements affects the outcome of an Atkins
claim. In this Part, how these applications have influenced outcomes in
the three selected states are examined.
A. Application ofAtkins
Alabama has not yet passed a statute delineating how defendants with
ID can be exempt from the death penalty. However, under the
"Intellectually Disabled Defendant Act" passed in 1975,66 Alabama's
criminal procedures covering defendants with ID provides the following
definition: "(3) Intellectually disabled person. A person with significant
subaverage general intellectual functioning resulting in or associated
with concurrent impairments in adaptive behavior and manifested during
the developmental period, as measured by appropriate standardized
testing instruments." 6 7 Although no strict cut-off score is noted, Alabama
courts have employed a strict IQ cut-off score for determining ID. 68 As
noted earlier, this means that the court does not apply the SEM to
calculate a score range. Furthermore, the words "resulting in or associated
with" means that a defendant's intellectual functioning must also be
associated with deficits in adaptive behavior. For this reason, if a
defendant does not satisfy the IQ threshold, it is not likely that he/she will
be able to show that any adaptive skill deficits are associated with, or
concurrent, with intellectual functioning.
Florida has had a statute barring the death penalty for defendants with
ID since before the Atkins ruling. 69 The Florida Rules of Criminal
65. See Haydt et al., supra note 7, at 369 (noting that because the DSM-IV-TR made no
mention of standardized measurements of adaptive functioning in early cases, such considerations
were largely ignored, so that if a defendant showed a low IQ, but "he was able to brush his teeth,
to comb his hair, to have sex, and to engage in criminal activity, it was argued that he didn't have
adaptive deficits and, thus, could not have Intellectual Disability").

§

66.

ALA. CODE

67.
68.

ALA. CODE § 15-24-2 (2015) (emphasis added).
See Blume et al., supra note 3, at 629.

15-24-1. (2015).

69. See State Statutes Prohibitingthe Death Penaltyfor People with MentalRetardation,
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-statutes-prohibiting-

death-penalty-people-mental-retardation?scid=28&d id=138 (last visited Apr. 30, 2014).
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Procedure Rule 3.203(b) defines ID as:
(b) Definition of Intellectual Disability. As used in this rule, the
term "intellectual disability" means significantly subaverage
general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits
in adaptive behavior and manifested during the period from
conception to age 18. The term "significantly subaverage general
intellectual functioning," for the purpose of this rule, means
performance that is two or more standard deviations from the mean
score on a standardized intelligence test authorized by the
Department of Children and Family Services in rule 65G-4.011 of
the Florida Administrative Code. The term "adaptive behavior,"
for the purpose of this rule, means the effectiveness or degree with
which an individual meets the standards of personal independence
and social responsibility expected of his or her age, cultural group,
and community. 70
Florida courts have also employed a strict IQ cut-off score for
determining ID. Similar to Alabama, the defendant must meet the
threshold IQ score for a successful Atkins claim.7 This use of a strict cutoff score for determining Atkins claims has been recently struck down by
the Supreme Court as unconstitutional. 7 2
Texas has yet to pass legislation for determining how to qualify a
defendant as satisfying an Atkins claim.7 3 In one of the first cases to
address an Atkins claim, the Texas court in Ex parte Briseno74 identified
a procedure by which a court could determine whether a defendant had
ID for the purpose of being exempt from the death penalty.7 5 In Briseno,
70. FLA. R. CRiM. P. 3.203(b) (emphasis added), availableat http://www.floridabar.org/
TFB/TFBResources.nsf/0/BDFE1551AD29IA3F85256B29004BF892/$FILE/Criminal.pdf?Ope
nElement.

71. Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 12 n.44 (noting that Florida requires clear and convincing
evidence). An Empirical Look at Atkins v. Virginia and Its Application in Capital Cases, supra
note 3, at 633 (finding that 50% of the losing Atkins claims based on the first prong in Florida
were a result of not meeting the state's cut-off score).

72. See Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990 (2014) (holding that Florida's requirement
that defendants meet an IQ threshold is unconstitutional because it fails to follow established
medical practice and creates an unacceptable risk that defendants with intellectual disabilities
might be executed).
73. See Peggy M. Tobolowsky, A Different Path Taken: Texas Capital Offenders' PostAtkins Claims of Mental Retardation,39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (2011).
74. Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 1.
75.
[T]he Briseno court identified a number of other potential factors that factfinders
in the criminal context could weigh for determining intellectual disability, such
as whether the person who knew the person during the developmental period
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Justice Cochran stated that the court would use the AAMR (now known
as the AAIDD) definition and that the judge may determine whether the
defendant has ID based on clear and convincing evidence. 76 Briseno court
agreed that the defendant's IQ of 72 and 74 met the first prong.7 7
However, there was disagreement on whether the defendant met the
second prong for deficits in adaptive behavior.7 1 Concluding that the
adaptive behavior criteria was too subjective, the court held there must
be other evidence for meeting this second prong.79 As a result, Texas
employs the Briseno factors delineated by Justice Cochran, allowing the
court to determine whether the defendant demonstrates significant
deficits in adaptive behaviors.8 0
Because of the wide variations across states in applying Atkins, the
effect of the Atkins decision has predictably varied as well.8 Yet, there
appears to be evidence that the Atkins decision has had some positive
effect. For example, the Death Penalty Information Center reported that
as of July 2012, there have been ninety-six post-conviction reversals of
death penalty sentences for defendants with ID because of Atkins. 82
Nevertheless, examination of the effect of the Atkins claims in Texas,
thought the person was intellectually disabled; whether the person formulated
plans and carried them through or was impulsive; whether person showed
leadership or was led around by others; whether responses to external stimuli
was rational and appropriate; whether person responds coherently, rationally, or
on point to oral or written questions or wanders from subject to subject; whether

the person can hide facts or lie effectively; and whether commission of an offense
required forethought, planning, and complex execution of purpose.
Hagstrom, supra note 41, at 8-9.

76. Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 8, 12.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. Scholars have referred to this as the "Lennie standard" because Justice Cochran
referred to Steinbeck's novel Of Mice and Men to identify ID based on the characteristics
portrayed in Lennie, a character in the novel who had moderate to severe ID. See, e.g., Haydt et
al., supra note 7, at 383; Mia-Carr6 B. Long, Note, OfMice and Men, Fairy Tales, andLegends:
A ReactionaryEthicalProposalto Storytellingand the Brisehlo Factors,26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs
859 (2013); John H. Blume et al., Of Atkins and Men: Deviationsfrom ClinicalDefinitions of
Mental Retardationin Death Penalty Cases, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 689 (2009).
80. Blume et al., supra note 79.

81. An Empirical Look at Atkins v. Virginia and Its Application in Capital Cases, supra
note 3 (concluding that there were wide variations in outcomes and that Atkins has not been
evenhandedly applied to protect defendants with intellectual disabilities).
82. Defendants Whose Death Sentences Have Been Reduced Because of a Finding of
"Mental Retardation" since Atkins v. Virginia, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER (2002), http://

www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/sentence-reversals-intellectual-disability-cases (last visited Apr. 26,
2014). This source reported that the highest percentage of reversals was from North Carolina, the
second highest percentage was from Texas, and the third highest percentage was from
Pennsylvania. Id
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Florida, and Alabama indicates substantial variation in outcomes, as can
be seen in Table 1.
TABLE I

Total
Atkins
claims

OVERVIEW OF SELECT STATES POST-ATKINS
Ds claiming ID
no longer on
Total
Total
Total failed
death row
successful
executions
Atkins
Atkins claims
post-Atkins
claims

AL

35

1(3%)

32

FL

49

3 (9%)

45

13 (5%)

TX

Ds claiming ID
still on
death row

Total on
death row

2 (6%)

5(15%)

29(15%)

197

35

1 (2%)

8(16%)

41(10%)

396

241

6(13%)

25(56%)

20(7%)

273

In Alabama, 15% (total of 5) of the defendants who had raised Atkins
claims are no longer on death row; in Florida, 16% (total of 8) are no
longer on death row; and in Texas, 56% (total of 25) are no longer on
death row. 83 Of those cases no longer on death row, Alabama had
executed 1, Florida had executed 3, and Texas had executed 13. This
represents 3%, 9%, and 5%, respectively, of the total executions for each
state since Atkins. 84 Among those no longer on death row, 6% (total of 2)
in Alabama, 2% (total of 1) in Florida, and 13% (total of 6) in Texas were
successful Atkins claims.
Some defendants are no longer on death row not as a result of a
successful Atkins claim, and these cases are not included as successful
Atkins claims. In Texas, four of the claims that resulted in removal from
death row were the result of a plea bargain after an Atkins claim was
initiated 5 and two others had died while in custody. In Florida, three of
the claims that resulted in removal from death row were the result of trial
issues, such as failure of counsel to sufficiently raise mitigating
circumstances during the penalty phase, and one defendant who had died
in custody. In Alabama, one defendant was removed from death row
because he was sixteen years old at the time when he participated in a
double murder. Reasons for the other Alabama defendant being removed
from death row were not available. However, this latter case involved a
83. To calculate these percentages, each state's department of corrections website was
searched for defendants identified from the WestlawNext search.
84. Compare this to the estimated 1-3% of the general population who has ID. See
Intellectual Disability, ARC, http://www.thearc.org/learn-about/intellectual-disability (last visited

July 5, 2014).
85.

Briseno, the case that defined the adaptive behavior criteria for Atkins claims in Texas,

was one of those cases. Diane Jennings, Death Sentence of Man Who Killed Sheriff Changed to
Life, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 3, 2013, http://crimeblog.dallasnews.com/2013/05/death-

sentence-of-man-who-killed-sheriff-changed-to-life.html/. Ironically, Briseno had reported IQ
scores of 72 and 74 and the court had denied his Atkins claim because it determined that Briseno
did not have ID. Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 14.
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female defendant who had hired someone to murder her husband. This
was a highly controversial case because the jury had sentenced the
defendant to life imprisonment, and the judge had overruled the jury's
determination. 8 6
These results indicate a substantially lower percentage of overall
successful Atkins claims from what was reported by Professors Blume,
Johnson, and Seeds in their analysis of Atkins cases up to 2008." This
could be due to the analysis for this paper not including those who had
raised an Atkins claim but subsequently plea bargained to have their
sentence changed to life imprisonment. Nevertheless, their finding that
only 12% of the Atkins claims in Alabama resulted in success8 8 is
somewhat closer and could be explained by the six-year difference in
time. The percentage of successful Atkins claims for Texas is similar
Peggy Tobolowsky's finding that 17% of Atkins claims in Texas were
successful. 89
B. Features of Successful Atkins Claims
Among the select states, successful Atkins claims were usually based
on a sufficiently low IQ score where the prosecution agreed with the
defendant's claim. As can be seen in Table 2, almost all of these
successful outcomes were based on IQs below 70.
TABLE 2
SUCCESSFUL ATKINS CLAIMS
State

Year
Sentenced

AL

1994

Reported IQ scores
66 (although one score of
79 was reported) 9
'

Defendant
James Henry
Borden 90

86. See William J. Bowers et al., The Decision Maker Matters: An EmpiricalExamination
of the Way the Role of the Judge and the Jury Influence Death Penalty Decision-Making, 63
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 931, 1010 (2006).

87. See An Empirical Look at Atkins v. Virginia and Its Application in Capital Cases, supra
note 3, at 628 n.16 (finding that nearly 38% of Atkins claims have been successful). One possible
reason for the differences is that the percentages reported here did not include cases that raised an
Atkins claim but were decided through plea bargaining rather than the merits of the Atkins claim.
The decision to not count those as successful Atkins claims was because the focus of this Article
was to examine how the court ruled on them.

88. Id at 629.
89. Tobolowsky, supra note 73, at 38.
90. Borden v. State, 769 So. 2d 935, 937 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997). Borden was convicted in
1994 for a second murder within a 20-year period, making it a capital offense. Id. Borden had
stabbed to death a 61-year old woman. Id.
91. Exparte Borden, 769 So. 2d 950, 957 (Ala. 2000).
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Defendant
Jeremiah
Jackson 9 2

State

Year
Sentenced

Reported IQ scores

AL

1996

65 (one score above 70)93

Donny Crook9 4
Timothy
Cockrell 96

FL

1996

TX

1993

TX

1994

62 to low 70s 95
31 or 35; scores ranging
between 25 and 42 9
no reported scores, but
"may have possessed a
limited IQ"99

TX

1985

58 to 6401

TX

1987

64103

Doil Lane 9 8
Willie Mack
Moddenioo
Jose Angel
Moreno' 02
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92. Jackson v. State, 963 So. 2d 150 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006). Jackson was convicted in
1996 of murder committed during the course of a robbery.
93. Jackson, 963 So. 2d at 156.
94. Crook v. State, 908 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 2005). Donny Crook was convicted in 1996 for
first-degree murder, robbery with a deadly weapon, and sexual battery with great force. Id. at
352-53.
95. Id. at 353.
96. Cockrell v. State, 933 S.W.2d 73, 75 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Timothy Cockrell was
convicted in 1993 for murdering a woman by strangling her and taking various items of property.
Id.
97. Brief for Appellate, Cockrell v. Texas, 1994 WL 16057551, at *17 (Tex. Crim. App.
1994).
98. Lane v. State, 933 S.W.2d 504, 507 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Doil Lane was convicted
in 1994 for the murder, kidnapping, and aggravated sexual assault of an eight-year-old girl. Id. at
506-07. Following the June 2002 Supreme Court's Atkins ruling, Doil Lane filed for an exemption
to execution claiming he had ID. ExparteLane, No. WR-67161-01, 2009 WL 252623 (Tex. Crim.
App. Feb. 4, 2009).
99. Lane, 933 S.W.2d at 512.
100. Modden v. State, 721 S.W.2d 859, 860 (Tex, Crim. App. 1986). Willie Mack Modden
was convicted in 1985 of intentionally and knowingly causing the death of a woman during the
course of committing a robbery. Id.
101. Ex parte Modden, 147 S.W.3d 293, 295 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Based on three
different reports by three different mental health experts, the court held that Modden did have ID.
Id.
102. Moreno v. State, 858 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Jose Angel Moreno
was convicted in 1987 of "murder in the course of committing or attempting to commit
kidnapping." Id.
103. Moreno v. Dretke, 362 F. Supp. 2d 773, 789 (W.D. Tex. 2005) af'd, 450 F.3d 158 (5th
Cir. 2006).
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Defendant

State

Year
Sentenced

Daniel Plata' 0 4
Gregory van
Alstynel 0 6

TX

1996

TX

1992

[Vol. 26

Reported IQ scores
56 to 69'0
56 to 69 on various
measures10 7

In the cases that had a reported IQ score above 70, the prosecution did
not challenge whether the defendant had ID (e.g., Borden, Jackson, and
Crook). Although it was reported that Jeremiah Jackson had one score of
over 70, the Alabama court affirmed that the defendant had ID because
of deficits in adaptive behavior scores.' 0 The court was further swayed
because both the defense and prosecution agreed that the defendant had
ID. 109 In Donny Crook's case, the prosecution presented no evidence to
rebut the defense's reports and conceded that the defendant had brain
damage."1 0
In Texas, Doil Lane's successful Atkins claim was based on very little
evidence of ID being noted. There is only one reference that Lane had ID
but no specific scores are reported. Lane's Atkins claim was not
forwarded, but was instead reviewed by the trial court on the merits, and
the court recommended that Lane's sentence be commuted to life
imprisonment.'11
Jose Angel Moreno's successful outcome was the result of a series of
appeals under both Penry and Atkins. Moreno's conviction preceded
Penry and his initial claim asserted that the charge submitted to the jury
was flawed because it failed to empower the jury to give effect to
mitigating evidence that had been offered during the penalty phase of his

104. Plata v. Cockrell, No. CIV A H-01-2587, at *] 2002 WL 34176720 (S.D. Tex. May 7,
2002). Daniel Plata, a foreign national from Mexico, was convicted in 1996 of murder that was
committed during a robbery of a convenience store. Id; see also Foreign Nationals, PartIII,
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER (July 2, 2013),

http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/foreign-

nationals-part-iii.
105. Exparte Plata, No. AP-75820, 2008 WL 151296 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 16, 2008).
106. Alstyne v. Cockrell, 35 F. App'x 386 (5th Cir. 2002). Gregory van Alstyne was
convicted in 1992 for the murder of a delivery man by beating and stabbing him and taking $20
cash. Id. at *1.
107. Exparte Van Alstyne, 239 S.W.3d 815, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Van Alstyne's
doctor presented evidence based on a three-hour clinical interview and concluded that Van
Alstyne's "thinking was highly concrete, and his ability to reason abstractly" was impaired. Id.
108. Jackson, 963 So. 2d at 156.
109. Id. at 157 (upholding the claim of intellectual disability, stating "[it] is not unusual for
defense evidence to support setting aside a death sentence. However, when the State's evidence

likewise supports such a finding, this Court is inclined to give deference to that evidence.").
110. Crook v. State, 813 So. 2d 68, 73 (Fla. 2002).
111. Exparte Lane, No. WR-67161-01, 2009 WL 252623 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 4,2009).
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trial, which the appeals court denied.1 2 In the first round of appeals, the
Texas district court noted that although evidence of Moreno's IQ of 64
was presented, Moreno did not have ID based on consideration of other
factors.11 3 Subsequently, Moreno raised a claim under Penry II in 2007
and this time the Texas district court remanded for a new sentencing
hearing in which the jury would be provided with instructions that could
give effect to Moreno's IQ and childhood experiences as mitigating
circumstances. 11 4 Because the evidence of Moreno's troubled childhood
during the sentencing phase of his trial could not be given meaningful
effect within the context of the statutory special issues at the time, the
district court held that the trial court had erred in failing to give separate
jury instructions that would empower the jury to assess a life sentence
based on the mitigating evidence." 5 As a result, the district court
reconsidered its previous ruling and remanded back to the trial court for
a new sentencing hearing." 6 In explaining its changed ruling, the court
noted the Supreme Court rulings from Penry and Atkins along with
Moreno's timely applications." 7
Gregory Van Alstyne presented an IQ score of 69, and the prosecution
presented evidence based on scores from the Vinelandthat indicated Van
112. ExparteMoreno, No. AP-75748, 245 S.W.3d 419,421 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 6,2008).
113. Moreno v. Dretke, 362 F. Supp. 2d 773, 789 (W.D. Tex. 2005) af'd, 450 F.3d 158 (5th
Cir. 2006). The court stated,
In support of his claim to be mentally retarded, however, petitioner presented the
state habeas court with only a report dated June 13, 2003 of a psychological
evaluation performed on petitioner that concluded that (1) petitioner had a full
scale score of 64 on an IQ evaluation; (2) this score might not be valid and may
"somewhat underestimate his true level of intellectual functioning" because
petitioner appeared to be poorly motivated and may have exaggerated his
deficits; (3) he was a poor personal historian, refusing to furnish any information
regarding his offense, and indicating that he received some special education
services while in school but failing to furnish any details regarding the specific
classes he attended; (4) his motor behavior, level of responsiveness, facial
expressions, eye contact, and affect were all within normal limits; (5) his speech
was free of articulation errors and he expressed himself appropriately with
adequate command of language; (6) his cognitive processing speed was
unremarkable; (7) he was oriented to time, place, person, and situation; (8) he
displayed no deficits in remote, recent, or intermediate memory; (9) he appeared
to have no difficulty concentrating or maintaining a cognitive set; (10) he
displayed no indication of organic brain impairment; and (11) he completed only
the eighth grade but later earned his GED.
Id.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Moreno, 245 S.W.3d at431.
Id.
Id.
Id.at421.
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Alstyne did not manifest adaptive behavior deficits." 8 Van Alstyne's
doctor countered that the Vineland scores were invalid because the
prosecution's doctor had relied on Van Alstyne's self-report and much of
the information provided overstated his adaptive abilities." 9
In summary, although small in number, these cases reflect a positive
influence of the Supreme Court's ruling in Atkins. The above cases were
probably successful because the reported IQ scores fell well below 70,
resulting in few disagreements between the prosecution and the defense.
It appears that when IQ scores fall within at least a certain range, there
are fewer disagreements and greater likelihood of a successful Atkins
claim.
C. FeaturesofFailedAtkins Claims Resulting in Execution
As shown in Table 3, most of the failed Atkins claims either did not
report an IQ score or reported IQ scores above 70 or there were significant
disagreements between the prosecution and defense's IQ scores. The only
failed claims despite lower than 70 IQ scores were from Texas. These
failed claims appeared to rely heavily on the court's determination of the
defendants' adaptive skills.

118. Exparte Van Alstyne, 239 S.W.3d 815, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
119. Id. at 820 (noting that defendant had reported being an "A" student, that he had spent
three months in the Marines, and that he had graduated from high school, which were all untrue).
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TABLE 3

FAILED ATKINS CLAIMS
Defendant

State

Year
Sentenced

Linroy
Bottoson' 20

FL

1983

Reported Scores
Terman IQ score of 77
when defendant was
twelve; Prosecution
presented average
Vineland score and IQ
of 85;121 IQ score of

Reason for denial of
Atkins claim

Date of
execution

Court held
defendant's scores
were insufficient to
show ID. 2 3

9/20/2006124

84122

1987

9/20/2006127

No actual scores were
reported, but court
indicated that score was
"sixteen points above
level required."l 2 6

Clarence
Edward
Hilll 25

FL

Carl
Blue'28

TX

1995

IQ between 75 and 80
presented by defense.' 2 '

Gayland
Bradford"'

TX

1990

None reported in court
documents; however,
online news source

No evidence by
defense that poor
school performance
was due to ID and
no other factors;
evidence was not
clear and
30
convincing.'

120. Bottoson v. State, 443 So. 2d 962, 964 (Fla. 1983). Linroy Bottoson was convicted in
1983 for the murder of a postmistress. Id at 963. The medical examiner reported that the victim
had been stabbed multiple times and had been run over by a car. Id. at 964.
121. Brief for Respondent, Bottoson v. Florida, (No. SCO2-128), 2002 WL 32131377, at *46 (Fla. Jan. 28, 2002).
122. Id. at *3.
123. Id. at *26.
124.

See

Execution List:

1976-present, FLORIDA

DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS,

http://www.dc.state.fl.us/oth/deathrow/execlist.html (last visited July 21, 2014).
125. Hill v. State, 515 So. 2d 176, 177 (Fla. 1987). Clarence Edward Hill was convicted in
1987 for killing a police officer and wounding another during a robbery of a savings and loan
association. Id.
126. Hill v. State, 921 So. 2d 579, 584 (Fla. 2006).
127. See Execution List: 1976-present, supra note 129.
128. Blue v. State, 125 S.W.3d 491, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Carl Blue was convicted
in 1995 of murder where he broke into a former girlfriend's apartment and threw gasoline on her
and set her on fire. Id. On July 5, 2005, Blue, filed his Atkins claim. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant
at 1, Exparte Blue, (No. AP 75-254) 2006 WL 1221863 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 7, 2006).
129. Exparte Blue, 230 S.W.3d 151, 163-64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
130. Id. at 164.
131. Bradford v. State, 873 S.W.2d 15 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Gayland Bradford was
convicted in 1990 for the murder of a security guard that occurred during a late-night armed
robbery. Id. at 16. In 2003, Bradford raised the claim that he had ID which the court denied. Ex
Parte Bradford, No. WR-44526-03, 2010 WL 4010361 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 11, 2010).
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Date of
execution

reported IQ score of
68.132

James
Clark' 3

TX

1994

Defense presented IQ
score of 65; a WISC-R
score of 74 when
defendant was fifteen;
and academic scores for
reading at 9.6, spelling
at 8.5, and math at 5.6
grade levels.' 34

Elroy
Chester'36

TX

1998

Jaime
Elizalde' 40

TX

The court
acknowledged
defendant's WISC-R
scores of 65 when he
was seven, 69 when he
was twelve, and 77
37
when he was thirteen' ;
Vineland score of 57.138
Defense presented
Revised Beta II score of
60 and FairCulture IQ
score of 96 from when
defendant was 18 years
old;' 4 ' IQ of 60 and
academic skills at the
4th grade level found in
disciplinary records
from the correctional

1997

Because score
presented by defense
was lower than
previous score of 74,
the court noted it
was possible that
defendant
deliberately missed
questions to get a
3
lower score. 1
Defendant failed to
satisfy the Briseno
factors.' 9

Low academic
performance was

due to frequent
absences from
school due to
asthma. 3 Court also
considered that
defendant worked as
a welder, was
married and

132. Bill Mears, Killer on Texas Death Row Gets Stay of Execution, CNN (Oct. 8, 2010),
http://news.blogs.cnn.com/2010/1 0/08/killer-on-texas-death-row-gets-temporary-stay-of-execut
ionc.

133.

Clark v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 273, 276 (5th Cir. 2000). James Clark was convicted in

1994 for murder of two individuals with a shotgun. Id at 277. Ten days before his scheduled

execution on November 21, 2002, Clark raised his Atkins claim for the first time and the court
remanded to the trial court to evaluate the claim. Exparte Clark, No. 37288-02, 2004 WL 885583

(Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 3, 2004).
134. Exparte Clark, No. 37288-02, 2004 WL 885583 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 3,2004).
135. Id.
136. Chester v. Quarterman, No. 5:05cv29, 2008 WL 1924245, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 29,
2008). Chester was convicted in 1998 for murder which was committed during a burglary and
rape, and was "the culmination of a six-month spree of criminal activity" in which "he burglarized
at least five residences, sexually assaulted two people, murdered at least five people, and fired
shots at no fewer than five others." Id.
137. Exparte Chester, No. AP-75037, 2007 WL 602607 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 28, 2007).
138. Id.
139. Id. at *4-5.
140. Ex parte Elizalde, No. WR-48957-02, 2006 WL 235036 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 30,
2006). Jaime Elizalde was convicted in 1997 for the capital murder of two men that he shot in a
bar. Id. at *1. On January 18, 2006, Elizalde filed an Atkins claim. Id.
141. Id.at*2.
143. Id.
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Date of
execution

department.'42

Yokamon
Hearn"'

TX

1998

Kia
Johnson's]

TX

1995

Danielle
54
Simpson

TX

2002

supported his wife
and two children."
WAIS-IIl and Stanford- Court refused
Binet scores of 88 and
defense expert
93 presented by
explanation that
46
prosecution.1 WAIS-III defendant had
score of 74 presented by medical diagnosis of
defense and Woodcock- brain syndrome as
Johnson Cognitive
evidence of ID 4 1;
Abilities test score of
noted that adaptive
87 .147
functioning deficits
must be linked to
intellectual
functioning to rule
out personality
9
disorder."'
Prior WAIS-R scores as Court concluded
low as 62-65 and as
there was
high as 72-75.152
insufficient evidence
to show ID.'a
Defense presented
WISC score of 71 and
TONI score of 72 when
defendant was
fourteen."' Prosecution
presented a TONI score

7/18/2012150

Court noted school
records showing that
defendant had
missed large number
of days of school but
managed to still pass

142. Id.
144. Id.
145. Heam v. Cockrell, No. CIV.A. 3:01-CV-2551-, 2002 WL 1544815 (N.D. Tex. July 11,
2002). Yokamon Hearn was convicted in 1998 of murder when he shot and killed the victim at
close range during the commission of a robbery and kidnapping. Id at *1. In March 2004, Hearn
filed a motion for stay of execution in order to explore the possibility of raising an Atkins claim.
Id. at *1-2. In October 2008, Hearn raised his Atkins claim. ExparteHearn, 310 S.W.3d 424 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2010).
146. Hearn, 310 S.W.3d at 427.
147. Id. at 429.
148. Id. at 431.
149. Id. at 429.
150.

See Death Row Information, supra note 141.

151. Exparte Johnson, No. 36139-04, 2003 WL 21715265 (Tex. Crim. App. June 6,2003).
Kia Johnson was convicted in 1995 of robbery and murder of a store clerk. Id. at *1. In 2003,
Johnson filed an Atkins claim. Id.
152. Id. at *2.
153. Id. (noting there was insufficient evidence to support a claim of ID because defendant
had not presented the court with the full results from the WAIS-R nor any evidence of adaptive
skill deficits).
154. Exparte Simpson, 136 S.W.3d 660, 661-62 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Danielle Simpson
was convicted in 2002 for the robbery and murder of an 84-year-old widow and retired teacher.
Id. This murder involved severely beating the woman, tying cinder blocks to her legs, and then
throwing her into the river to drown. On December 3, 2002, Simpson filed his Atkins claim. Id at
662.
155. Id. at 664.
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of 84 when he arrived
on death row.' 6

almost all of his
classes."
Court denied
defendant's petition
as an "abuse of the
writ" and did not
consider the
merits."'

Jose
Villegas' 58

TX

2002

No reported scores.

Bobby
Woods

TX

1988

Michael

TX

2000

WAIS-III score of 65,
Court found that
adjusted for the Flynn
there was sufficient
62
effect ; SIB-R results
evidence to show
indicating adaptive
that defendant had
skills deficits in the area ID and that he could
63
of money and value.'
have manufactured
Prosecution presented
his claim in order to
WAIS-R short form
escape
6
punishment.
score of83."
WA IS-Ill score of 67
Court found defense
and 1991 WISC-R score evidence
of7l .' Report by
unpersuasive and7
possibly biased,
defense expert that
defendant had adaptive
but found persuasive
behavior and academic
testimony by
deficits in seven
prosecution
witnesses, a

Hall' 6 7

156.
15 7.
158.

[Vol. 26

Date of
execution

4/16/2014'

12/3/200916

2/15/2011

Id. at 666.

Id.
Villegas v. Quarterman, 274 F. App'x 378, 379 (5th Cir. 2008). Jose Villegas was

convicted in 2002 for the capital murder of his girlfriend, her three-year-old son, and her mother
following his girlfriend's mother telling him to leave the house after finding him and his girlfriend

using cocaine. Id. On April 23, 2004, Villegas raised an appeal regarding the sentencing phase of
his conviction which was denied. Exparte Villegas, No. WR-62023-02, 2014 WL 1512926 (Tex.
Crim. App. Apr. 14, 2014). Then, on April 8, 2014, he raised his Atkins claim. Id. at * 1.

159. Id.
160. See Death Row Information, supra note 14 1.
161. Exparte Woods, 296 S.W.3d 587, 590, 595 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Bobby Woods
was convicted in 1988 for the murders of a nine-year-old boy and his eleven-year-old sister with
whom he had engaged in "sexual activity." Id at 588, 590. He had killed the boy by severely

beating and choking him and the girl by beating and cutting her throat. Id. at 590. Woods' first
appeal was filed in 1999 and was denied. Id. at 595.

162.
163.
164.
165.

Idat 596.
Id
Idat603.
Id.

166.

See Death Row Information, supra note 14 1.

167. Hall v. State, 160 S.W.3d 24, 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Michael Hall was convicted
in 2000 for the abduction and murder of a nineteen-year-old woman with a disability, which was
considered to be a thrill killing. Id. at 28.

168.

Hall v. Quarterman, No. 4:06-CV-436-A, 2009 WL 612559, at *17..18 (N.D. Tex. Mar.

9,w2009).

171.

Id.at*43.
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different areas.' On the
WRA T, "reading score
placed him at an IQ of
59, his spelling score at
an IQ of 51, and his
arithmetic score at an
IQ of 55.""wo

videotaped interview
of defendant, the
hearing on
defendant's pro se
motion to remove
his attorneys, and the
circumstances of the

371

Date of
execution

72

crime.1

Unlike the successful Atkins claims, these failed Atkins claims reflect
differing interpretation of test scores between those presented by the
defense and those presented by the prosecution. When presented with
conflicting scores, court decisions appeared to be swayed by the
prosecution. Particularly with the Texas cases, there were strong
sentiments expressed regarding defendants' incentive to malinger in
order to avoid the death penalty. Several of the Texas cases lost because
of reports of the defendant's prison behaviors, behaviors during court, or
abilities in daily life prior to prison. These observations were important
to the court's assessment that the defendant did not have adaptive skills
deficits. This conclusion is similar to what Blume, Johnson, and Seeds
found in their 2008 research.1 73 During Michael Hall's trial, the Texas
court found persuasive a videotaped interview of Hall that did not appear
to indicate any adaptive skills deficit, an earlier hearing on Hall's pro se
motion to remove his attorneys, and the circumstances of the crime to
conclude that Hall did not have ID.1 74 During Danielle Simpson's trial,
the expert for the prosecution pointed to Simpson's letter-writing
campaign from jail asking for contraband, noting that Simpson's
behaviors indicated a "lack of empathy" and a "callous disregard for
others" which were behaviors consistent with psychopathy, not ID.'
Although Elkie Taylor scored a 65 on the WAIS-III and a 71 on the
Kaufman,1 76 the court was "permitted to discount these scores due to the
incentive to malinger." 177 The defense noted deficits in adaptive

169. Id.
170. Id.
172. Id.
173. An Empirical Look at Atkins v. Virginia and Its Application in Capital Cases, supra
note 3, at 636 (finding that in 30% of the losing cases, the court relied on information about the
defendant's prison behavior, and 75% of the Florida cases that had satisfied the IQ requirement
but failed on the adaptive behavior prong were based on reports of the defendant's behavior in
prison, how the crime was carried out, or in-court behavior).

174.
175.
176.
177.

Hall, 2009 WL 612559, at *42.
Simpson, 136 S.W.3d at 665.
Taylor, 498 F.3d at 308.
Id.
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behavior, 7 8 and the prosecution pointed to Taylor's behaviors during the
crimes as evidence that he did not have deficits in adaptive functioning.1 79
During Holly Wood's trial, the Alabama court noted evidence of Wood's
"abilities to drive a fork lift, to manage money, to maintain a relationship
with his girlfriend, and other similar evidence" to conclude that Woods
did not have ID. 8 0

In a few of the Texas cases, the defendants challenged use of the
Briseno factors for determining adaptive skill deficits. For example,
Elroy Chester claimed that the state court's use of the Briseno factors to
determine his ID was an unreasonable application of Atkins.' 8 ' Chester
challenged each Briseno factor.1 82 In support, the AAIDD also submitted
an amicus brief asking the court to grant Chester's claim of ID and raising
questions with Texas' method for determining ID in Atkins claims.1 8 3
Nevertheless, the Texas court found Chester's abilities to converse on a
variety of topics, his ability to plan his crimes, and his ability to hide facts
and to lie as evidence that he did not have deficits in adaptive behavior
skills.1 84
178. Id. ("Taylor purportedly had difficulty maintaining a steady job, got confused using
public transportation, had trouble cooking rice well as a child, made poor use of his leisure time
by sitting in his apartment and just listening to the radio and talking on the phone").
179. Id. The court noted,
For example, having perceived an opportunity for robbing Otis Flake, he planned
and executed Flake's murder. Further, having learned from his experience of
murdering Ramon Carrillo, Taylor skipped the use of his hands and went straight
to the use of a coat hanger in order to murder Flake. When the policeman
questioned him about the television stolen from Flake's apartment, he quickly
thought up a lie that worked. Then, when ultimately found, he successfully
maneuvered an 18-wheeler cab for over 150 miles and then, when caught, tried
to blame someone else for his crimes.
Id.
180. Wood, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 1228.
181. Exparte Chester, 2007 WL 602607, at *5.
182. Id. at *4 (arguing that people who knew him during his developmental period was not
able to accurately diagnose intellectual disability; that although he is capable of some planning, it
does not indicate he does not have ID because individuals with ID are capable to some planning;
and that although he responds rationally and appropriately to questions, it is not an indication that
he does not have ID, because individuals with ID are capable of responding rationally and
appropriately to questions and situations).
183. See Brief of American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Chester v. Texas, (No. 11-1391), 2012 WL 2371464
(2012).
184. Chester, 2007 WL 602607, at *4-5. The court noted,
As to whether the applicant responded coherently and rationally to oral or written
questions, the trial court considered the testimony of both parties' experts
regarding an evaluation of the applicant conducted by Dr. Ed Gripon, the State's
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Yokamon Hearn's defense raised the issue of deferring to a medical
diagnosis rather than relying on assessment results. The expert for the
defense stated that substituting a medical diagnosis for a
neuropsychological measure is "justified when there is a medical
diagnosis of brain syndrome or lesion, such as Fetal Alcohol Spectrum
Disorder ... because it is well known that such conditions cause a mixed
pattern of intellectual impairments that . . . are not adequately

summarized" in a full-scale IQ score.' 85 However, the Texas court
refused to use this method for determining ID.1 86
A couple of the Texas cases raised issues with adjusting IQ scores
based on the Flynn Effect. For example, Bobby Woods' districtappointed psychologist reported that Woods' IQ score on the WAIS-III
was 68, which was an adjusted score for the Flynn Effect.' 8 7 Additionally,
this score of 68 would indicate a score range of 63 to 73, taking into

expert. The court was more persuaded by Dr. Gripon's testimony that the
applicant was able to converse with him coherently on a wide variety of topics,
including current politics, the concept of parole violations, and many specific
facts of the crimes to which the applicant had confessed. . . .The trial court also
found that the applicant was capable of hiding facts and lying to protect his own
interests, as demonstrated by the episode in which he told the investigators that
he would take them to where he had hidden his gun, all the while apparently
planning to get to the gun himself before the investigators could. Finally, the
court found that the specifics of the various crimes to which the applicant
confessed, including the use of masks and gloves, his practice of cutting exterior
phone lines before entering homes to burglarize, and his deliberate targeting of
victims like Cheryl DeLeon and his brother-in-law Albert Bolden, showed
persuasively that the applicant was capable of forethought, planning, and
complex execution of purpose.
Id.
185.
186.
187.

Hearn, 310 S.W.3d at 430.
Id. at 431.
Woods, 296 S.W.3d at 596. In explaining the use of the Flynn effect, the expert stated,
And basically what that effect is saying is that education is getting better,
nutrition is getting better, for a variety of reasons, and, also, a lot of items in the
norms are-become dated, that people just generally show a slight improvement

over time, and for that reason we need to be somewhat careful in using a dated
or an older IQ test, because at that three-tenths per year, if we're looking at giving
a person a test based on 10-year-old norms, then their IQ score might be three
points higher than it would have been had the person been tested when those
norms were current 10 years previously. The norms for this test were developed
in 2002 and, therefore, there's a 2-year lag. Applying Flynn's criteria of threetenths of a point per year, six-tenths of a point might be the average expected
improvement.

Id.
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consideration the 5-point SEM.' 8 8 The prosecution claimed that use of
the Flynn Effect was "an unexamined, highly-criticized, and
controversial scientific theory not properly used by clinicians for
diagnosis."l 89 The court held that this new report did not undermine the
previously presented evidence that Woods did not have ID and would not
rule on whether it was appropriate to apply the Flynn Effect.' 9 0 Carl
Blue's defense also sought to apply the Flynn effect.191 Blue's IQ score
fell between 75 and 80, and this score, after applying the Flynn effect,
would fall between 64 and 69.192 The court refused to apply the Flynn
Effect, noting that even if there was evidence to "support a strong
suspicion" that Blue had ID, the evidence was not clear and
convincing.1 93
Another pattern in the Texas cases was how the court determined
which side was more credible. The Texas courts appeared to express
greater skepticism with defense expert opinions, along with concerns
with potential malingering by defendants. In all of these failed Atkins
claims, the court found the prosecution's argument more persuasive or
the experts for the prosecution more credible. For example, during
Michael Hall's trial, the psychologist for the defense reported that Hall's
IQ of 67 was evidence of ID.194 Another expert for the defense also
concluded that Hall met the criteria for having ID.1 9 5 The prosecution
188.
189.
190.

Id.
Id. at 607-08.
Id. at 613 (noting that even after applying the Flynn effect, Woods' IQ score would be

191.
192.
193.
194.

Exparte Blue, 230 S.W.3d 151, 163-64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
Id. at 165-66.
Id. at 164-66.
Hall, 2009 WL 612559, at *17-18. The court noted,

73).

Applicant has critical deficits in his adaptive skills and behavior.

...

[Biased on

the reported history and documentation, Applicant has suffered from [intellectual

disability] since a very early age, if not from birth. Thus, his condition originated
during the developmental period. In addition to her diagnosis that Applicant is
[intellectually disabled], Dr. Church notes that Applicant's physical appearance
is typical of a person who suffers from Fetal Alcohol Syndrome or Fetal Alcohol
Effect. It is entirely possible that Applicant suffers from one of these conditions
as there is evidence that Applicant's mother was an alcoholic. Either of these
conditions would be a correlate of Applicant's [intellectual disability].
Id. at * 18 (alteration in original).

195. Hall v. State, 160 S.W.3d 24, 29 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). This expert reported Hall's
WAIS-IIf IQ score at 67. Id. He also noted that a 1991 WISC-R had placed his IQ at 71, when Hall
was classified as learning disabled but an earlier 1988 evaluation had classified Hall as having an
intellectual disability. Id. Based upon interviews, the psychologist concluded that Hall exhibited
adaptive behavior deficits in seven different areas: "(1) independent functioning (eating, dressing,
transportation), (2) economic activity (handling money), (3) language development, (4) self-
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presented expert testimony that Hall scored in the low-average range in
adaptive skills, but was not intellectually disabled.1 9 6 The court held that
although Hall "supported his claim of [intellectual disability] with the
testimony of three psychologists, his mother, his brother, his trial
attorneys, two private investigators, four teachers, and a fellow death row
inmate," the state's presentation of testimonies "from a psychologist, five
prison guards, a waitress, appellant's former work supervisor, a former
co-worker, and a police detective" were more persuasive.1 9 7 The court
also questioned the bias of the defense.1 9 8 Weighing the testimony and
evidence presented, the court found that although there was evidence in
support of a finding of ID, there was also significant evidence for a
finding that Hall did not have ID.1 9 9 In Elroy Chester's case, the court
specifically noted the differing qualifications of the expert for the defense
and the expert for the prosecution, leading the court to find the
prosecution's expert more credible.2 00
For some of the failed Atkins claims in Texas, timing of the appeal
seemed to have been relevant. The Texas cases appear to indicate that
when an Atkins claim is raised for the first time just prior to the scheduled

direction (excessive passivity), (5) socialization (ability to interact with others), (6) social
engagement, and (7) functional academics." Id This expert further noted that Hall could not play
cards, give directions to his home, identify nearby streets, travel to his workplace on his own,
would not brush his teeth or use a table knife. Id. at 28.
196. Hall, 2009 WL 612559, at *22.
197. Id at 43.
198. Id. The court noted,
Again, the court's perception is that the experts were advocating a case of

[intellectual disability] for the benefit of Hall rather than to make objective
presentations to the court. The court finds Dr. Price's testimony [expert for the

prosecution] on the subject of adaptive functioning to be the most persuasive.
The other experts selectively used information that would support their adaptive

functioning theory, and they seem to have disregarded information available to
them that put into question their stated findings.
Id. (alteration in original).
199. Hall v. State, 160 S.W.3d 24, 39-40 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
200. Chester, 2007 WL 602607, at *4. The court noted,
The trial court also noted the discrepancy in credentials between the two experts,
particularly that, while Dr. Gripon [expert for the prosecution] had been
practicing in the field of psychiatry for thirty-two years and had testified in Texas
courts on issues of mental retardation numerous times, the applicant's expert had

been licensed for six years, in which time he had held a total of seven jobs, none
for longer than two years. The trial court found the State's expert's testimony to
be more credible.
Id. (alteration in original).
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execution, the Texas courts are less likely to grant the defendant's claim
of exemption due to ID. This appears to be the case despite a borderline
IQ score because a defendant has a heightened motivation to receive a
low score. For example, in Ex parte Hearn, the court noted that postAtkins, the court had received a number of applications from death row
inmates alleging ID. 2 0 1 In Richard Williams' case, the court noted the
"1 Ith hour" stay request. 202 Furthermore, the court noted that it would
give deference to the trial court's conclusion unless there was no support
for that determination based on the court records. 203
III. ISSUES FOR FUTURE

A TIlNs

CLAIMS

Understanding ID will continue to be challenging for jurors and
judges who have very little to no experience with measurements and the
effects of medical conditions and childhood experiences on how ID
manifests. Two new issues are likely to complicate this process: the new
definitions of ID contained in the DSM-5 204 and the recent Supreme Court
ruling in Hall.205 Although a step forward because both the DSM-5 and
the Hall ruling now require states to use the SEM to arrive at a score
range rather than a strict cut-off score, the Hall ruling still did not fully
address the issues that are inherent in relying solely on standardized
measures for determining ID.
A. Emerging Trends in Defining IntellectualDisability
Several issues faced by the courts could change with the new 2013
APA's DSM-5 manual.2 0 6 The APA notes "[b]y removing IQ test scores
201. Hearn, 310 S.W.3d at 427.
202. Williams, 2003 WL 1787634, at *1.
203. Id.
204. Haydt et al., supra note 7, at 379.
205. Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1989 (2014). The Court noted,
When a defendant's IQ test score falls within the test's acknowledged and
inherent margin of error, the defendant must be able to present additional
evidence of intellectual disability, including testimony regarding adaptive
deficits. This legal determination of intellectual disability is distinct from a
medical diagnosis but is informed by the medical community's diagnostic
framework, which is of particular help here, where no alternative intellectual
disability definition is presented, and where this Court and the States have placed
substantial reliance on the medical profession's expertise.
Id.
206. Haydt et al., supra note 7, at 379 ("For the most part, these changes are intended to
make for greater flexibility in basing diagnoses on clinical judgment, with less emphasis on IQ
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from the diagnostic criteria, but still including them in the text description
of ID, DSM-5 ensures that they are not overemphasized as the defining
factor of a person's overall ability, without adequately considering
functioning levels."2 0 7 Whether the DSM-5 will influence the courts
remains to be seen. Either way, the public view of ID is likely to continue
to be based on inadequate understanding and personal biases because
distinguishing between mild ID, learning disability and other mental
health conditions, such as autism, can be difficult for nonprofessionals.2 0 8
B. Impact of Hall v. Florida
In summer 2014, the Supreme Court held that Florida's method for
determining ID is unconstitutional.2 0 9 Freddie Lee Hall had presented IQ
scores ranging from 60 to 80 and exhibited a range of deficits in adaptive
behavior skills. 210 However, the Florida courts only considered the test
results showing IQ scores in the 71 to 80 range and held that Hall's IQ
scores disqualified him as having ID.211 Florida courts had determined
that if a defendant received an IQ score of 70 or higher (without
application of either the Flynn Effect or SEM), the Atkins claim would
fail.2 12 Professional organizations had denounced this narrow method
because it did not comport with established professional practice. 2 13
Although proponents might hail the Hall ruling as a step in the right
direction, based on a review of how states are implementing Atkins
claims, it is doubtful that Hall will have a substantial effect for many
because only nine states currently use a strict IQ cut-off score. 2 14 Because
both Alabama and Florida employ the strict IQ cut-off score, the cases
presented in this paper could have had different outcomes. However, in
reviewing those cases, it is not likely that the Hall ruling would have
scores, and IQ ceilings. The DSM-5 links deficits in adaptive functioning with co-occurring
deficits in intellectual functioning and requires a careful examination of adaptive behavior for
reliable interpretation of IQ scores").
207.

Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, INTELLECTUAL DISABILiTY FACT SHEET, http://www.dsm5.org/

documents/intellectual%20disability%20fact%20sheet.pdf (last visited July 9).
208. See Haydt et al., supra note 7, at 362 (noting that the term "mild ID" is a twentieth
century invention).

209.
210.
211.
212.

Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1990.
Id. at 1992.
Id.
Id. at 1990.

213.

See Fabian et al., supranote 50.

214.

Lizette Alvarez & John Schwartz, IQ. Cutoff Ruling May Spare Some Inmates on

Death Row, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2014, http://www. nytimes.com/2014/05/29/us/supreme-court-

strikes-down-floridas-strict-iq-cutoff-for-executions.html?_r-0 ("Justice Anthony M. Kennedy's
count, there are nine states that, either by law or by court decision, were free to use similar I.Q.
cutoffs to sentence someone. The nine are Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Kansas,
Kentucky, North Carolina, Virginia and Washington.").
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changed the outcomes, because the failed Atkins claims from those states
did not involve IQ scores that were close to 70 or would have been after
adjusting for the SEM. Bottoson's IQ score was the closest, with reported
IQ scores between 77 and 85. Consequently, it is unlikely that the Hall
decision would have prevented his execution because the lowest adjusted
score after applying the SEM would have been 72. Nevertheless, a
number of Atkins claims have yet to be decided, and how Hallwill affect
those claims is still unknown.
IV. CONCLUSION

There is a tension between the professional and legal definitions of
ID, as was reflected in Justice Cochran's dicta in Briseno.2 15 As was seen
in the Texas failed Atkins claims, this tension appears to be rooted in the
fear that defendants could be malingering. 2 16
Another source of tension appears to be rooted in whether the death
penalty should be appropriate for anyone. Those who oppose the death
penalty tend to favor a loose definition of ID for purposes of ensuring that
fewer defendants are executed.2 17 Drs. Greenspan and Switzky propose
that because the purpose of Atkins was premised on the concept of moral
culpability, any individual who exhibits social incompetence or limited
social intelligence due to a medical condition should be exempted from
execution, regardless of actual IQ score. 2 18 In other words, individuals
with a "brain-based disorder" (e.g., Dandy-Walker syndrome) are often
socially vulnerable, even though they may have IQ scores above 70, and
Atkins claims should apply to them. 219 Others have pointed to the
evolving definitions of ID and that reliance on one single definition will
continue to be problematic because such definitions are prone to
continuous, and often times, arbitrary change and developing objective
measures will always be subject to problems with validity. 220
215.
216.

Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 6; see also Hagstrom, supra note 41, at 253-54.
See, e.g., Michael D. Chafetz & Alex Biondolillo, Validity Issues in Atkins Death

Cases, 26 CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGIST 1358 (2012); Karen L. Salekin & Bridget M. Doane,
MalingeringIntellectual Disability: The Value ofAvailable Measures and Methods, 16 APPLIED

NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 105, 106 (2009) (citing Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Atkins in which
he noted that definitions of ID could be readily feigned and that determinations of ID was highly
dependent on accuracy of measures).
217. See generally Kenneth Jost, Death Penalty Debates19 CQ RESEARCHER 965 (2010),
availableat https://www.unc.edul-fbaum/teaching/articles/CQResearcher-DeathPenaltyDebates.
pdf.
218. Greenspan & Switzky, supra note 32, at 23.
219. Id at 24-25 (arguing that presence of actual medical diagnosis would eliminate the
arbitrariness of determining who would, and who would not, qualify for exemption from the death
penalty).
220. Id at 21 (noting that intellectual disability is a "bureaucratic functional category
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Unfortunately, how courts determine which defendants have ID and
should be exempted from the death penalty has resulted in arbitrary
results. The Court's statements regarding arbitrary imposition of the
death penalty in Furman v. Georgia seems particularly relevant:
Yet our task is not restricted to an effort to divine what motives
impelled these death penalties. Rather, we deal with a system of
law and of justice that leaves to the uncontrolled discretion of
judges or juries the determination whether defendants committing
these crimes should die or be imprisoned. Under these laws no
standards govern the selection of the penalty. People live or die,
dependent on the whim of one man or of 12.221
A. Emerging Views ofIntellectual Disability
A new and evolving conception of ID frames the condition under a
social construction model.2 22 This view takes into account how societal
views of disability affect our conceptions as opposed to a medical model
where views of disability are determined by some external objective
measure based on procedures employed in arriving at a diagnosis.2 23 This
model of disability requires examining a person's unique circumstances
because ID is often associated with psychosocial issues and the
interaction of the individual's condition and the environment rather than
solely based on an organic cause.22 4 Furthermore, under this model, there
is a recognition that attempts to label and measure an individual's
functioning level is problematic and in many cases invalid.2 25 One
proposed approach is to examine actual vulnerability of the defendant.2 26
In reviewing the cases that have raised Atkins claims, it is striking how
many of the cases reported significantly troublesome conditions during
the defendants' childhood. Scholars have documented that many children
masquerading as a medical etiological category," and that the diagnostic criteria has been arbitrary
where prior to 1973, the criteria for ID was an IQ score below 85, while today, the criteria is at
70 or below).
221. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 253 (1972).
222.

See Susan R Jones, Toward Inclusive Theory: Disability as Social Construction, 33

NASPA4, 347 (1996); W.M.L. Finlay & E. Lyons, Rejecting the label: A Social Constructionist
Analysis, 43 MENTAL RETARDATION 2, 120 (2005).
223. Deborah Marks, Models ofDisability, 19 DISABILITY & REHABILITATION 3, 85 (1997);

Adam M. Samaha, What Good is the Social Model ofDisability?, 74 U. CHI. L. REv. 1251 (2007)
(although Samaha argues against use of the social model of disability, he presents a concise
overview of what the model entails).
224. Michael L. Wehmeyer et al., The Intellectual DisabilityConstruct and Its Relation to
Human Functioning, 46 INTELL. & DEV. DISABILITIES 4, 311 (2008); Samaha, supra note 250, at

1251.
225.
226.

Wehmeyer et al., supra note 251.
Greenspan & Switzky, supra note 32.
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with ID are at increased risk of being abused and mistreated. 2 27 These
childhood experiences tend to exacerbate developmental vulnerabilities
due to biological factors that caused the ID. Furthermore, a child with ID
who had the benefits of a positive childhood experience may have less
negative effects resulting from the ID. This interaction of the individual's
biological condition and the social context is important to consider.
Educating judges and juries about this is important as they attempt to
understand how ID can manifest and how an individual tested on one
measure could vary considerably from another individual receiving the
exact same score.
B. Ending the Elusive Search
Because of the inherent issues with measuring ID, the search for such
measures will continue to be elusive and a new approach is needed. Such
a new approach could follow Drs. Greenspan and Switzky's
recommendation for a more medical definition of ID, or a new approach
could be expanded based on an understanding of the social construction
of ID. Reliance on standardized measures of ID based on IQ and adaptive
skill measures will continue to create problems, especially in the judicial
context.2 2 8 An approach based on this view will require special expertise
and clinical judgment. 229 Determinations of who has ID cannot be left to
the courts and juries because determination of ID using standardized
measures will always be imprecise.
Historically, the purpose of determining ID was for allocation of
services, benefits, and treatments. 230 Instruments designed and used for
these purposes have less potential of harm to the person being evaluated.
Using such instruments and procedures for determining whether someone
should be executed was never intended. Such a use raises the question of
whether this type of high stakes use is ever appropriate and whether an
identification procedure based on the least dangerous assumption 23 1
would be more appropriate, particularly for establishing the standard of
proof that a defendant must bear when raising an Atkins claim. The
227. See Patricia M. Sullivan & John F. Knutson, Maltreatment and Disabilities: A
Population-BasedEpidemiologicalStudy, 24 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 10, 1257 (2000) (noting

that close to 31% of children with disabilities were subject to mistreatment, compared to 9% of
children without disabilities).
228.

See generally Penny J. White, Treated Differently in Life but Not in Death: The

Execution of the IntellectuallyDisabledAfter Atkins v. Virginia, 76 TENN. L. REV. 685 (2008).
229.

SCHALOCK & LUCKASSON, supra note 62.

230.

Weithorn, supra note 4, at 1223.

231.

See, e.g., Anne M. Donnellan, The Criterionof the Least Dangerous Assumption, 9

BEHAV. DISORDERS 141 (1984) (noting that in the absence of knowing whether something is true
or not, it is preferable to make the assumption that would cause the least amount of harm, or
making assumptions that would be the least dangerous for an individual).
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problems with false positives (incorrectly identifying someone as having
ID) versus false negatives (incorrectly identifying someone as not having
ID) appears to underlie our views of justice. For determining benefits, it
appears that society can tolerate false positives, but for determining
punishment, society should not tolerate false negatives. As Professor Lois
Weithorn states,
Given that the death penalty is the most severe punishment
available in our criminal justice system and-once carried out-is
irrevocable, state policies must err on the side of casting a net that
is too wide rather than one that is too narrow in defining
"[intellectual disability]" for the purpose of death penalty
eligibility.23 2
With this in mind, the courts could better reflect the aims ofjustice by
acknowledging that intellectual disability is difficult to define through
rigid assessment procedures. High burden of proof standards and overreliance on standardized measures applied within formulaic procedures
unfortunately deny constitutional protections for the defendants that
Atkins was meant to protect. Understanding the interplay of context,
(childhood experiences and circumstances) and the individual
vulnerability due to a biological condition should be considered. In other
words, the effects of intellectual disability are often socially determined.
And, to fully understand this, professional and clinical judgment will be
critical.

232.

Weithom, supra note 4, at 1233.
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